<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Research on System Overlord</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/tags/research.html</link><description>Recent content in Research on System Overlord</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><managingEditor>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</managingEditor><webMaster>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://systemoverlord.com/tags/research/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Lessons Learned from SSH Credential Honeypots</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2020/09/04/lessons-learned-from-ssh-credential-honeypots.html</link><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2020/09/04/lessons-learned-from-ssh-credential-honeypots.html</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;For the past few months, I&amp;rsquo;ve been running a handful of SSH Honeypots on some
cloud providers, including &lt;a href="https://cloud.google.com"&gt;Google Cloud&lt;/a&gt;,
&lt;a href="https://m.do.co/c/b2cffefc9c81"&gt;DigitalOcean&lt;/a&gt;, and
&lt;a href="https://shareasale.com/r.cfm?b=1380239&amp;amp;u=2497236&amp;amp;m=46483&amp;amp;urllink=&amp;amp;afftrack="&gt;NameCheap&lt;/a&gt;.
As opposed to more complicated honeypots looking at attacker behavior, I decided
to do something simple and was only interested in where they were coming from,
what tools might be in use, and what credentials they are attempting to use to
authenticate. My dataset includes 929,554 attempted logins over a period of a
little more than 3 months.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you&amp;rsquo;re looking for a big surprise, I&amp;rsquo;ll go ahead and let you down easy: my
analysis hasn&amp;rsquo;t located any new botnets or clusters of attackers. But it&amp;rsquo;s been
a fascinating project nonetheless.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>CVE-2019-10071: Timing Attack in HMAC Verification in Apache Tapestry</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2019/08/23/cve-2019-10071-timing-attack-in-hmac-verification-in-apache-tapestry.html</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Aug 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2019/08/23/cve-2019-10071-timing-attack-in-hmac-verification-in-apache-tapestry.html</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="description"&gt;Description&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apache Tapestry uses HMACs to verify the integrity of objects stored on the
client side. This was added to address the Java deserialization vulnerability
disclosed in CVE-2014-1972. In the fix for the previous vulnerability, the
HMACs were compared by string comparison, which is known to be vulnerable to
timing attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 id="affected-versions"&gt;Affected Versions&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Apache Tapestry 5.3.6 through current releases.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3 id="mitigation"&gt;Mitigation&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No new release of Tapestry has occurred since the issue was reported. Affected
organizations may want to consider locally applying commit
d3928ad44714b949d247af2652c84dae3c27e1b1.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Playing with the Gigastone Media Streamer Plus</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2018/01/28/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-gigastone-media-streamer.html</link><pubDate>Sun, 28 Jan 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2018/01/28/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-gigastone-media-streamer.html</guid><description>&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;TOC
{:toc}&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="background"&gt;Background&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A few months ago, I was shopping on &lt;a href="https://www.woot.com"&gt;woot.com&lt;/a&gt; and
discovered the &lt;a href="http://amzn.to/2C76sRQ"&gt;Gigastone Media Streamer Plus&lt;/a&gt; for about
$25. I figured this might be something occassionally useful, or at least fun to
look at for security vulnerabilities. When it arrived, I didn&amp;rsquo;t get around to
it for quite a while, and then when I finally did, I was terribly disappointed
in it as a security research target &amp;ndash; it was just too easy.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>[CVE-2017-17704] Broken Cryptography in iStar Ultra &amp; IP ACM by Software House</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2017/12/18/cve-2017-17704-broken-cryptography-in-istar-ultra-ip-acm-by-software-house.html</link><pubDate>Mon, 18 Dec 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2017/12/18/cve-2017-17704-broken-cryptography-in-istar-ultra-ip-acm-by-software-house.html</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="introduction"&gt;Introduction&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerabilities were identified in the iStar Ultra &amp;amp; IP-ACM boards offered by
Software House. This system is used to control physical access to resources
based on RFID-based badge readers. Badge readers interface with the IP-ACM
board, which uses TCP/IP to communicate with the iStar Ultra controller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These were discovered during a black box assessment and therefore the
vulnerability list should not be considered exhaustive; observations suggest
that it is likely that further vulnerabilities exist. It is strongly
recommended that Software House undertake a full whitebox security assessment of
this application. Additionally, it is our suggestion that all communications be
conducted over TLS. While alternatives are suggested below, cryptography is
very difficult even for experts, and so using a well-understood cryptosystem
like TLS is preferable to home-grown solutions. The version under test was
indicated as: 6.5.2.20569. As of the time of disclosure, the issues remain
unfixed.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>[CVE-2014-5204] Wordpress nonce Issues</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2014/09/10/cve-2014-5204-wordpress-nonce-issues/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2014 22:54:52 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2014/09/10/cve-2014-5204-wordpress-nonce-issues/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Wordpress 3.9.2, released August 6th, contained fixes for two closely related
vulnerabilities (CVE-2014-5204) in the way it handles Wordpress nonces (CSRF
Tokens, essentially) that I reported to the Wordpress Security Team. I&amp;rsquo;d like
to say the delay in my publishing this write-up was to allow people time to
patch, but the reality is I&amp;rsquo;ve just been busy and haven&amp;rsquo;t gotten around to this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TL;DR:&lt;/strong&gt; Wordpress &amp;lt; 3.9.2 generated nonces in a manner that would allow an
attacker to generate valid nonces for other users for a &lt;strong&gt;small&lt;/strong&gt; subset of
possible actions. Additionally, nonces were compared with &lt;code&gt;==&lt;/code&gt;, leading to a
timing attack against nonce comparison. (Although this is very difficult to
execute.)&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>CVE-2014-4182 &amp; CVE-2014-4183: XSS &amp; XSRF in Wordpress 'Diagnostic Tool' Plugin</title><link>https://systemoverlord.com/2014/07/04/cve-2014-4182-cve-2014-4183-xss-xsrf-in-wordpress-diagnostic-tool-plugin/</link><pubDate>Fri, 04 Jul 2014 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate><author>david@systemoverlord.com (David Tomaschik)</author><guid>https://systemoverlord.com/2014/07/04/cve-2014-4182-cve-2014-4183-xss-xsrf-in-wordpress-diagnostic-tool-plugin/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Versions less than 1.0.7 of the Wordpress plugin &lt;a href="https://wordpress.org/plugins/diagnostic-tool/"&gt;Diagnostic Tool&lt;/a&gt;, contain several vulnerabilities:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Persistent XSS in the Outbound Connections view. An attacker that is able to cause the site to request a URL containing an XSS payload will have this XSS stored in the database, and when an admin visits the Outbound Connections view, the payload will run. This can be trivially seen in example by running a query for &lt;code&gt;http://localhost/&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;alert(/xss/)&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; on that page, then refreshing the page to see the content run, as the view is not updated in real time. This is CVE-2014-4183.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>