I’m trying something new – a “Security 101” series. I hope to make these topics readable for those with no security background. I’m going to pick topics that are either related to my other posts (such as foundational knowledge) or just things that I think are relevant or misunderstood.
Today, I want to cover Virtual Private Networks, commonly known as VPNs. First I want to talk about what they are and how they work, then about commercial VPN providers, and finally about common misconceptions.
At the most basic level, a VPN is intended to provide a service that is equivalent to having a private network connection, such as a leased fiber, between two endpoints. The goal is to provide confidentiality and integrity for the traffic travelling between those endpoints, which is usually accomplished by cryptography (encryption).
The traffic tunneled by VPNs can operate at either Layer 2 (sometimes referred to as “bridging”) or Layer 3 (sometimes referred to as “routing”) of the OSI model. Layer 2 VPNs provide a more seamless experience between the two endpoints (e.g., device autodiscovery, etc.) but are less common and not supported on all platforms. Most VPN protocols operate at the application layer, but IPsec is an extension to IPv4, so operates at Layer 3.
The most common VPN implementations you’re likely to run into are IPsec, OpenVPN, or Wireguard. I’ll cover these in my examples, as they’re the bulk of what individuals might be using for personal VPNs as well as the most common option for enterprise VPN. Other relatively common implementations are Cisco AnyConnect (and the related OpenConnect), L2TP, OpenSSH’s VPN implementation, and other ad-hoc (often TLS-based) protocols.
A Word on Routing
In order to understand how VPNs work, it’s useful to understand how routing works. Now, this isn’t an in-depth dive – there are entire books devoted to the topic – but it should cover the basics. I will only consider the endpoint case with typical routing use cases, and use IPv4 in all my examples, but the same core elements hold for IPv6.
IP addresses are the sole way the source and destination host for a packet are
identified. Hostnames are not involved at all, that’s the job of DNS.
Additionally, individual sub networks (subnets) are composed of an IP prefix and
the “subnet mask”, which specifies how many leading bits of the IP refer to the
network versus the individual host. For example,
that the host is host number 10 in the subnet
192.168.1 (since the first 3
octets are a total of 24 bits long.).
1 2 3 4 % ipcalc 192.168.1.10/24 Address: 192.168.1.10 11000000.10101000.00000001. 00001010 Netmask: 255.255.255.0 = 24 11111111.11111111.11111111. 00000000 Network: 192.168.1.0/24 11000000.10101000.00000001. 00000000
When your computer wants to send a packet to another computer, it has to figure
out how to do so. If the two machines are on the same sub network, this is
easy – it can be sent directly on the appropriate interface. So if the host
with the IP
192.168.1.10/24 on it’s wireless network interface wants to send a
192.168.1.22, it will just send it directly on that interface.
If, however, it wants to send a packet to
220.127.116.11, it will need to send it via
a router (a device that routes packets from one network to another). Most
often, this will be via the “default route”, sometimes represented as
0.0.0.0/0. This is the route used when the packet doesn’t match any other
route. In between the extremes of the same network and the default route can be
any number of other routes. When routing an outbound packet, the kernel picks
the most specific route.
Most typically, a VPN will be configured to route all traffic (i.e., the
default) via the VPN server. This is often done by either a higher priority
routing metric, or a more specific route. The more specific route may be done
via two routes, one each for the top and bottom half of the IPv4 space.
Of course, you need to make sure you can still reach the VPN server – routing traffic to the VPN server via the VPN won’t work. (No VPN-ception here!) So most VPN software will add a route specifically for your VPN server that goes via the default route outside the VPN (i.e., your local router).
For example, when connected via Wireguard, I have the following routing tables:
1 2 3 4 5 % ip route default dev wg0 table 51820 scope link default via 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 proto dhcp metric 600 10.13.37.128/26 dev wg0 proto kernel scope link src 10.13.37.148 192.168.20.0/24 dev wlp3s0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.20.21 metric 600
10.13.37.148/26 is the address and subnet for my VPN, and
is my local IP address on my local network. The routing table provides for a
wg0, my wireguard interface. There’s a routing rule that prevents
wireguard traffic from itself going over that route, so it falls to the next
route, which uses my home router (running pfSense)
to get to the VPN server.
The VPN only provides its confidentiality and integrity for packets that travel via its route (and so go within the tunnel). The routing table is responsible for selecting whether a packet will go via the VPN tunnel or via the normal (e.g., non-encrypted) network interface.
Just for fun, I dropped my Wireguard VPN connection and switched to an OpenVPN connection to the same server. Here’s what the routing table looks like then (tun0 is the VPN interface):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 % ip route default via 10.13.37.1 dev tun0 proto static metric 50 default via 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 proto dhcp metric 600 10.13.37.0/26 dev tun0 proto kernel scope link src 10.13.37.2 metric 50 10.13.37.0/24 via 10.13.37.1 dev tun0 proto static metric 50 198.51.100.6 via 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 proto static metric 600 192.168.20.0/24 dev wlp3s0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.20.21 metric 600 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 proto static scope link metric 600
This is a little bit more complicated, but you’ll still note the two default
routes. In this case, instead of using a routing rule, OpenVPN sets the
metric of the VPN route to a lower value. You can think of a
being a cost to a route: if multiple routes are equally specific, then the
metric (cost) is the one selected by the kernel for routing the packet.
Otherwise, the routing table is very similar, but you’ll also notice the route
specifically for the VPN server (
198.51.100.6) is routed via my local gateway
192.168.20.1). This is how OpenVPN ensures that its packets (those encrypted
and signed by the VPN client) are not routed over the VPN itself by the kernel.
Note that users of Docker or virtual machines are likely to see a number of additional routes going over the virtual interfaces to containers/VMs.
Using VPNs for “Privacy” vs “Security”
There are many reasons for using a VPN, but for many people, they boil down to being described as “Privacy” or “Security”. The single most important thing to remember is that the VPN offers no protection to data in transit between the VPN server and the remote server. Where data reaches the remote server, it looks exactly the same as if it had been sent directly.
Some VPNs are just used to access private resources on the remote network (e.g., corporate VPNs), but a lot of VPN usage these days is routing all traffic, including internet traffic, over the VPN connection. I’ll mostly consider those scenarios below.
When talking about what a VPN gets you, you also need to consider your “threat model”. Specifically, who is your adversary and what do you want to prevent them from being able to do? Some common examples of concerns people have and where a VPN can actually benefit you include:
- (Privacy) Prevent their ISP from being able to market their browsing data
- (Security) Prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on public/shared WiFi
- (Privacy) Prevent tracking by “changing” your IP address
Some scenarios that people want to achieve, but a VPN is ineffective for, include:
- (Privacy) Preventing “anyone” from being able to see what sites you’re visiting
- (Privacy) Prevent network-wide adversaries (e.g., governments) from tracking your browsing activity
- (Privacy) Prevent all tracking of your browsing
Commercial VPN providers have the advantage of mixing all of your traffic with that of their other customers. Typically, a couple of dozen or more inbound connections come out from the same IP address. They also come with no administration overhead, and often have servers in a variety of locations, which can be useful if you’d like to access Geo-Restricted content. (Please comply with the appropriate ToS however.)
On the flip side, using a commercial VPN server has just moved the endpoint of your plaintext traffic to another point, so if privacy is your main concern, you’d better trust your VPN provider more than you trust your ISP.
If you’re after anonymity online, it’s important to consider who you’re seeking anonymity from. If you’re only concerned about advertisers, website operators, etc., than a commercial VPN helps provide a pseudonymous browsing profile compared to coming directly from your ISP-provided connection.
Rolling Your Own
Rolling your own gives you the ultimate in control of your VPN server, but does require some technical know-how. I really like the approach of using Trail of Bits’ Algo on DigitalOcean for a fast custom VPN server. When rolling your own, you’re not competing with others for bandwidth and can choose a hosting provider in the location you want to get nearly any egress you want.
Alternatively, you can set up either OpenVPN or Wireguard yourself. While Wireguard is considered cleaner and uses more modern cryptography, OpenVPN takes care of a few things (like IP address assignment) that Wireguard does not. Both are well-documented at this point and have clients available for a variety of platforms.
Note that a private VPN generally does not have the advantage of mixing your traffic with that of others – you’re essentially moving your traffic from one place to another, but it’s still your traffic.
When people are new to the use of a VPN, there seems to be a lot of misconceptions about how they’re supposed to work and their properties.
VPNs Change Your IP Address
VPNs do not change the public IP address of your computer. While they do usually assign a new private IP for the tunnel interface, this IP is one that will never appear on the internet, so is not of concern to most users. What it does do is route your traffic via the tunnel so it emerges onto the public internet from another IP address (belonging to your VPN server).
Generally speaking, when someone refers to a VPN leak, they’re referring to the ability of a remote server to identify the public IP to which the endpoint is directly attached. For example, a server seeing the ISP-assigned IP address of your computer as the source of incoming packets can be seen as a “leak”.
These are not, generally, the fault of the VPN itself. They are usually caused by the routing rules your computer is using to determine how to send packets to their destination. You can test the routing rules with a command like:
1 2 3 % ip route get 18.104.22.168 22.214.171.124 dev wg0 table 51820 src 10.13.37.148 uid 1000 cache
You can see that, in order to reach the IP
126.96.36.199 (Google’s DNS server), I’m
routing packets via the
wg0 interface – so out via the VPN. On the other
hand, if I check something on my local network, you can see it will go directly:
1 2 3 % ip route get 192.168.20.1 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 src 192.168.20.21 uid 1000 cache
If you don’t see the VPN interface when you run
ip route get <destination>,
you’ll end up with traffic not going via the VPN, and so going directly to
the destination server. Using ifconfig.co to test the IP
being seen by servers, I’ll examine the two scenarios:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 % host ifconfig.co ifconfig.co has address 188.8.131.52 % ip route get 184.108.40.206 220.127.116.11 dev wgnu table 51820 src 10.13.37.148 uid 1000 cache % curl -4 ifconfig.co 198.51.100.6 ... shutdown VPN ... % ip route get 18.104.22.168 22.214.171.124 via 192.168.20.1 dev wlp3s0 src 192.168.20.21 uid 1000 cache % curl -4 ifconfig.co 192.0.2.44
Note that my real IP (
192.0.2.44) is exposed to the
ifconfig.co service when
the route is not destined to go via the VPN. If you see a route via your local
router to an IP, then that traffic is not going over a VPN client running on
your local host.
Note that routing DNS outside the VPN (e.g., to your local DNS server) provides a trivial IP address leak. By merely requesting a DNS lookup to a unique hostname for your connection, the server can force an “IP leak” via DNS. There are other things that can potentially be seen as an “IP leak,” like WebRTC.
A VPN “killswitch” is a common option in a 3rd party clients. This endeavors to block any traffic not going through the VPN, or block all traffic when the VPN connection is not active. This is not a core property of VPNs, but may be a property of a particular VPN client. (For example, this is not built in to the official OpenVPN or Wireguard clients, nor the IPSec implementations for either Windows or Linux.)
That being said, you could implement your own protection on this. For example,
you could block all traffic on your physical interface except that going between
your computer and the VPN server. For example, using
iptables, and with your
VPN server being 198.51.100.6 on UDP port 51820, a pair of rules like this one
will block all other traffic from going out on any interface except interfaces
1 2 3 iptables -P OUTPUT REJECT iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 51820 -d 198.51.100.6 -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -o wg+ -j ACCEPT
VPNs Protect Against Nation-State Adversaries
There’s a lot of discussion on VPN and privacy forums about selecting “no logging” VPNs or VPN providers outside the “Five Eyes” (and the expanded selections of allied nations). To me, this indicates that these individuals are concerned about Nation-State level adversaries (i.e., NSA, GCHQ, etc.). First of all, consider whether you need that level of protection – maybe you’re doing something you shouldn’t be! However, I can understand the desire for privacy and the uneasy feeling of thinking someone is reading your conversations.
No single VPN will protect you against a nation-state adversary or most well-resourced adversaries. Almost all VPN providers receive the encrypted traffic and route the plaintext traffic back out via the same interface. In such a scenario, any adversary that can see all of the traffic there can correlate the traffic coming into and out of the VPN provider1.
If you need effective protection against such an adversary, you’re best to look at something like Tor.
One approach to avoiding local VPN configuration issues is to use a separate router that puts all of the clients connected to it through the VPN. This has several advantages, including easier implementation of a killswitch, support for clients that may not support VPN applications (e.g., smart devices, e-Readers, etc.). If configured correctly, it can ensure no leaks (e.g., by only routing from its “LAN” side to the “VPN” side, and never from “LAN” to “WAN”).
I do this when travelling with a gl.inet AR750-S “Slate”. The stock firmware is based on OpenWRT, so you can choose to run a fully OpenWRT custom build (like I do) or the default firmware, which does support both Wireguard and OpenVPN. (Note that, being a low-power MIPS CPU, throughput will not match raw throughput available from your computer’s CPU, however it will still best the WiFi at the hotel or airport.
VPNs are not a Panacea
Many people look for a VPN as an instant solution for privacy, security, or anonymity. Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. Understanding how VPNs work, how IP addresses work, how routing works, and what your threat model is will help you make a more informed decision. Just asking “is this secure” or “will I be anonymous” is not enough without considering the lengths your adversary is willing to go to.
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